This paper examines the use of so called 'double breasting' as a means of union avoidance among multinational companies (MNCs). Double breasting refers to the practice whereby multi-establishment organizations simultaneously operate establishments on both a union and non-union basis. Using survey data from the largest and most representative empirical investigation of employment practice in MNCs in Ireland to date and supplemented by qualitative data gathered from case based investigations in the subsidiary operations of American owned MNCs, we profile the incidence and pattern of this particular form of union avoidance as well as providing insights on management's rationale for so doing. Our findings suggest that a substantial and increasing number of unionized MNCs in Ireland are engaging in double breasting. This phenomenon is most evident among U.S. MNCs. We also find that employers, at both local and global level, has proactively initiated double breasting as a strategic ploy to increase management prerogative and better position subsidiary operations to attract new investment from corporate levels.
Subtle but deadly -union avoidance through 'double breasting' among multinational companies Introduction
Employer resistance to union recognition has a long and chequered history and can take many forms. These largely straddle the continuum from union suppression to union substitution. Categorizations such as 'suppression versus substitution' (and more nuanced variants thereof) provide a useful framework for analyzing the manifest strategies engaged in by employers to thwart union penetration. However, such a workplace focus suffers from some significant drawbacks. By largely concentrating on direct employer opposition it overlooks indirect and subtler union resistance strategies on the part of employers. For example, it fails to address the impact of higher (corporate) level employer thinking with respect to union avoidance and the more imperceptible avoidance strategies developed at this level. Nor does it inform the reasons why employers may seek to avoid trade unions.
In this paper we seek to partially address this gap by focusing on the utilization of socalled 'double breasting' arrangements among multinational companies (MNCs) in Ireland. Using survey data from the largest and most representative empirical investigation of employment practice in MNCs in Ireland to date and supplemented by qualitative data gathered from case based investigations in the Iris subsidiary operations of American owned MNCs, we profile the incidence and pattern of this particular form of union avoidance. We also provide some insights on the managerial rationale for engaging in double breasting.
Ireland represents a particularly appropriate locale for evaluating union recognition and avoidance in MNCs, given its high level of foreign direct investment (FDI). (OECD, 2006) . This is a quite exceptional feat for a small nation of just over 4 million people. It makes Ireland one of the world's most MNC-dependent economies, with the great majority of these foreign MNCs located in a small number of export-oriented high technology sectors, notably electronics, pharmaceuticals/healthcare, software, and international services This paper is structured as follows. We firstly address the broad area of trade union recognition and avoidance, particularly as it applies to MNCs and the Irish experience. We then examine the concept of double breasting and subsequently review the Irish industrial relations (IR) environment, where we identify particular changes impacting on union avoidance and specifically on managerial capacity and willingness to engage in double breasting. This is followed by an outline of our research methodology. The next section contains our main findings on the incidence and pattern of double breasting among the MNC population. In the penultimate section we explore possible employer rationales for engaging in double breasting and in the final section we present our main conclusions.
According to the UN

Employer approaches to trade union avoidance
In Britain and Ireland at least, much of the research on industrial relations in multinational companies (MNCs) has focused on either ab initio union avoidance (i.e.
non recognition in newly established sites) or on de-recognition in longer established firms (Gall, 1999; Dundon, 2002; Edwards & Ferner, 2002; . In
Ireland, several studies have highlighted the marked increase in trade union avoidance, particularly among American MNCs establishing at greenfield facilities (cf. Gunnigle, 1995 , Gunnigle et al., 1997 Geary & Roche, 2001; Lavelle, 2008) .
Recent evidence finds no abatement in this trend, as union avoidance has increasingly become the option of choice for new inward investing MNCs, particularly those of U.S. origin (Industrial Relations News, 2003) . In contrast, older MNCs, particularly those that established in the 1960s and 1970s, are seen as more solidly unionized (cf. Roche & Geary, 1997) . This reflects the fact that such inward-investing MNCs, both
American and other foreign-owned, overwhelmingly conformed to prevailing local norms by recognizing trade unions and relying on collective bargaining as the main vehicle for handling workplace industrial relations (Enderwick, 1986) . For American MNCs, this often meant a break with a company tradition of union avoidance. Many of these long-standing unionized MNCs are located in the manufacturing sector. This 'conformance' pattern began to fade from the turn of 1980s. Since then many new inward-investing MNCs have increasingly and successfully avoided union recognition. Consequently, the received wisdom is that while unions remain reasonably well entrenched in older MNCs, they have been effectively excluded from vast tranches of new MNC operations.
Union de-recognition, which Bassett (1986) sees as the sharpest form of union avoidance, achieved particular prominence in the UK during the Thatcher era (Beaumont & Harris, 1995; Claydon, 1996; Gall & McKay, 2004) . There it appeared to reach its high-water mark in the early 1990s and has fallen more recently, with some evidence of a softening in employer approaches in the face of the statutory union recognition provisions of the Employment Relations Act, 1999 (Gall, 2004) .
Unlike its larger neighbor, de-recognition of trade unions has never being an important feature of the Irish industrial relations landscape. Indeed, a detailed search for instances of union de-recognition since 1997 in both the European Industrial
Relations Directory and Industrial Relations News i yielded less than a handful of cases.
In summary, the available evidence points to a greatly increased level of ab initio union avoidance among MNCs in Ireland since the early 1980s, while finding little evidence of de-recognition of trade unions. However, a major drawback of this research is the failure to consider the potential for changes in the pattern of union recognition within unionized firms. In effect, there appears to be a tacit acceptance that while union avoidance is commonplace among newer MNCs, particularly those located in 'high tech' sectors, union penetration among older MNCs in more traditional sectors remains more or less intact. This is hardly a tenable perspective,
given the dynamic for change in workplace industrial relations in both union and nonunion contexts. An especially critical omission is the phenomenon of double breasting, whereby unionized firms seek to operate some (generally newer) facilities on a non-union basis.
The concept of double breasting and its relevance in Ireland
The term 'double breasting' has its origins in America's construction industry. It came into popular usage many decades ago to describe the practice whereby construction firms would choose to operate both unionized and non-union subsidiaries (cf. Doherty, 1989) . The incentive for this practice was to avoid higher wages and related employment costs in the unionized sector and, furthermore, to gain a competitive edge from the greater discretion and flexibility afforded to management as a consequence of union avoidance. Such benefits included less demarcation along craft lines, greater scope to employ semi-or non-skilled workers and greater management control of the pace and nature of work. Such argued advantages have clearly proved attractive as American scholars have charted the increased use of double breasting arrangements in the US construction sector (cf. Northrup, 1995) , its spill-over into neighboring Canada (Rose, 1986 ) and diffusion to other sectors of the US economy, notably manufacturing and transportation (cf. Edwards & Swaim, 1986 ).
In the European context, Beaumont (1985 Beaumont ( , 1987 Beaumont & Harris, 1992; Beaumont & Townley, 1985) has been to the fore in documenting the incidence of double breasting. This work largely focused on investigating the extent to which multi-establishment organizations might "…simultaneously operate establishments on both a union and non-union basis" (Beaumont & Harris, 1992: 268) and on phenomenon of unionized firms establishing new 'greenfield site' facilities on a nonunion basis (Beaumont & Townley, 1995) . This work was particularly useful in providing greater prescription of forms that employer decisions to engage double breasting might take, namely unionized companies (a) opening a new operation on a non-union basis and/or (b) acquiring an existing non-union plant and continuing to operate it on a non-union basis (see Beaumont & Harris, 1992) .
The Irish Industrial Relations Environment
We now turn to the Irish host context and to the changing business and industrial relations environment which, we argue, has increased employer capacity to avoid trade unions, either on initial start-up or via double breasting.
The Irish industrial relations system, though commonly perceived as an exemplar of (Gunnigle, 1998; Roche, 2007) . Often these expansions involved either the opening or acquisition of new sites, thereby increasing the multi-establishment nature of MNC activity and increasing the opportunity, at least, for double breasting.
Since the turn of the 1980s, Ireland has thus witnessed the development of a burgeoning non-union sector, led in large measure by MNCs. This can be traced to changes in the Irish economic and social environment that facilitated increased union avoidance and -potentially -a growth in double breasting. Given that the objective of this paper is to inform the extent of double breasting as a means of union avoidance in MNCs, we have opted to focus on firstly establishing the broad profile of union recognition and avoidance among the population of MNCs in Ireland. We subsequently investigate in greater detail the incidence of double breasting, and finally we seek to explain employer and management rationale for engaging in double breasting. We now outline our methodology.
Methodology
The primary source of data used in this study is a large-scale survey of employment practice in MNCs in Ireland (cf. Gunnigle et al., 2007 1 vi . Data on double breasting was garnered during questioning of respondents on the area of "Employee representation and consultation", which was one of four substantive areas of employment practice addressed in the survey.
Apart from profiling the incidence and pattern of double breasting, we also explore the managerial rationale behind the decision to double breast. Here we primarily rely on data gathered from case studies of employment practice in the Irish operations of five American owned MNCs. Summary details on these five MNCs is provided in appendix 1. These data were garnered through 63 in-depth interviews with managers (at all levels), employees, employee representatives and trade union officials and supplemented by information from company documentation, web sources and observation. While the Irish study largely drew on subsidiary-level insights, we also utilized data from interviews at corporate and European headquarter (HQ) level in one of the companies and from European regional HQ level in another.
Insert Table 1 MNCs were excluded, and we know from the literature that larger organizations are more likely to recognize unions (Beaumont and Harris, 1989; Roche, 2001) . Thirdly, our survey -unlike previous studies -included indigenous MNCs as well as foreign owned MNCs. As we will see below, union recognition is much higher among Irish owned MNCs. Finally, our investigation was focused at an organizational rather than establishment level. Thus, where a multi-establishment MNC recognized trade unions at just one site, then this case was categorized as a 'unionized' MNC.
In discerning a pattern with regard to union recognition, it is clear that country of ownership matters (Lavelle, 2008 Turning now to the nub of this paper, we noted earlier that management decisions to engage in double breasting may take the form of opening a new site on a non-union basis (cf. Verma & Kochan, 1985; Beaumont & Harris, 1992 As might be expected, we found a strong country of origin influence on the extent of double breasting, see figure 2. In line with our earlier observations on the pattern of union avoidance, Irish and U.K. owned MNCs were far more likely to recognize a trade union at all new site(s). European MNCs display a mixed pattern when it comes to union recognition in new sites, which may be explained by the disparate make-up of this country group. However, U.S. owned MNCs were by far the least likely to recognize trade unions at new sites. Indeed no U.S. owned MNC reported recognizing a trade union in all of their new sites.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The management rationale for double breasting
While the absence of a base-line Irish study renders it impossible to assess the precise scale of this increase, our major conclusion is that a substantial and increasing number of unionized MNCs in Ireland are engaging in double breasting. Why is this happening, and why now? From a management choice perspective two scenarios are posited. First, it may be that employers are reacting to a negative experience of unions by progressively reducing the extent of union penetration in their operations.
Alternatively, it may be that employers are proactively using a context of declining union density to opportunistically reduce union penetration. Our survey asked management respondents in unionized operations to describe whether the approach generally adopted by unions was 'cooperative', 'adversarial' or varied according to the issue at hand. While these categorizations may appear be somewhat crude, they are essentially designed to identify overall union orientation, while acknowledging that unions (like management) will always deploy some level of adversarialism when addressing distributive issues. The findings for MNCs that had opened new sites over the past five years are outlined in Table 3 . These provide no evidence of an embedded adversarial approach on behalf of trade unions. Rather it seems that that unions either pursue a cooperative approach or alter their approach depending on the issue under discussion. These findings suggest that management are not being pushed into double breasting due to particularly negative experiences of trade unions but for other reasons which, which may be either operational or strategic in nature.
Insert 2. Re-claim management prerogative: Increasing the decision-making capacity of local management seems to be an important operational reason highlighted by managers for engaging in double breasting. In particular, managers emphasized the greater freedom afforded by non-union status to make and implement operational decisions, particularly an increased capacity to introduce changes in work and employment practices. One particular quote from the survey research demonstrates this point.
The principal reason we don't recognize unions is due to flexibility Human Resource Director, U.K. Manufacturing MNC.
A more specific manifestation of the potential advantage of double breasting in helping management reclaim prerogative arose in relation to pay determination. Our survey findings indicate that unionized MNCs tend to pay at or above the wage norms agreed through national wage bargaining. However, the case study evidence from U.S. MNCs engaging in double breasting (mentioned above) noted a more recent drive by local management to 'rein in' the tendency to concede above the norm increases and bring them into line with the average the average level of pay increases (cf. Gunnigle et al, 2005 ; also see Industrial Relations News, 2002).
3. Less union demand: another specific rationale raised by management was 'demand' related, namely that younger, well-educated workers in non-union sites exhibited little inclination to join trade unions:
My feeling here is that employees don't want to join a trade union. These people are knowledge workers…they don't want a union... they don't see (2008) found that younger workers were in fact more positively disposed than older workers to the need for trade unions. In
Ireland, we find that levels of unionization are lowest among younger age cohorts (Quarterly National Household Surveys, 2004 . However, this is more likely to be related to the lack of availability of trade unions in more and more workplaces than to a fall in union demand. This is evidenced in Geary's (2007) finding that some twothirds of respondents in non-union workplaces would like to join a union in situations where management are supportive of union representation. However, where management do no support union representation, this figure falls to less than a third (28 per cent), indicating that union demand pivots substantially around the postures of employers attitudes towards collective employee representation via trade unions.
Drawing again on case study data on MNCs, Gunnigle et al. (2005) found that while an effective post-entry closed shop operated in the longer established unionized sites, the new sites were completely non-union. Consequently, workers in these sites were not afforded the opportunity to join -in essence union supply has been cut off (cf. Green, 1990 ).
4. A changing balance of advantage? Finally, and most significantly, management respondents emphasized that their decision to go non-union was largely related to a confidence that they could carry it off without any great difficulty. Such confidence can be traced to the changing socio-political environment and the comparative freedom afforded to local management in terms of industrial relations policies and practices, and reduced capacity of trade unions to oppose employer moves in this regard (for greater detail, see Gunnigle et al., 2006 ). It appears that Ireland's industrial relations context has now transitioned from a comparatively prescriptive system in the 1960s and 70s, whereby managers felt they had little choice but to conform to local 'tradition' by recognizing trade unions and engaging in collective bargaining. While this approach often flew in the face of home country practice of American companies in particular, local managers seemed to feel it was the only rational choice. As has been observed elsewhere, Ireland's recent evolution to a highly internationalized and developed economy has been accompanied by the emergence of a significantly more permissive industrial relations context within which employers feel increasingly able to avoid union recognition (cf. Gunnigle et al., 2006) . This development first became apparent through ab initio union avoidance in greenfield MNC start-ups but now clearly embraces double breasting in older, hitherto unionized MNCs.
It is noteworthy that in none of the cases did management explicitly articulate the view that enhanced productivity might constitute an advantage of union avoidance.
Nor were we able to access reliable measures productivity in either union or nonunion operations. We are therefore unable to comment on this aspect of the decision to go non-union beyond our conclusion management's desire to increase management prerogative in operational decision-making represented an important factor positively impacting on the decision of hitherto unionized firms to establish new sites on a nonunion basis.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have sought to profile the pattern of double breasting among the MNC population in Ireland and provide a nuanced analysis of the reasons behind this development. In do doing, we utilize a strategic choice lens. This assumes that employers possess some room for maneuver and though environmental factors may limit choice, senior management retain the capacity to make decisions on key aspects of industrial relations policy and practice (cf. Poole, 1986; Marchington & Parker, 1990) . It therefore embraces the degree to which employers possess and exercise strategic choice in industrial relations. Decisions to open a new site or acquire an existing facility represent particularly germane examples. In the US, for example, we find numerous instances of firms that have switched the locus of their operations to southern states to benefit both from lower non-union wages and from the reduced prospect of union penetration as a result of a more 'employer-friendly' political and social climate (cf. Verma, 1985; Kochan et al., 1986) . The globalization of capital through international investment by MNCs provides a more contemporary context within which to evaluate the pattern of employer and management choice in industrial relations. One particular dimension relates to MNC decisions on where to locate foreign operations (Cooke & Noble, 1998) . Here, we find considerable international evidence to suggest that industrial relations systems, and particularly the level of institutional constraint on management decision-making and choice, can significantly influence the location decisions of MNCs (Cooke, 2003; Kleiner & Ham, 2003) .
Since industrial relations systems and practices differ between countries, MNCs may engage in 'regime shopping' as they seek out locations for investment which offer the most favorable conducive context, one aspect of which is the relative freedom to choose and deploy their preferred industrial relations 'style' (Traxler, 2000) .
However, we have much less evidence on how MNCs operate within specific national systems once the location decision is made. Of particular interest is the extent to which MNCs act as agents for change by introducing particular industrial relations innovations, which may, in time, alter the characteristics of the system itself (Ferner and Quintanilla, 2002) . For example, much of the research on industrial relations in MNCs primarily focuses on whether MNCs recognize trade unions for the purposes of collective representation or not (Innes & Morris, 1985; Edwards & Ferner, 2002; Almond, et al, 2005) . However, as Kochan et al. (1986) 
